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The	Saudi	Intervention	in	Yemen:	Struggling	for	Status	
	
May	Darwich1	
Assistant	Professor	in	International	Relations	of	the	Middle	East	at	Durham	University,	
United	Kingdom	
E‐mail:	may.darwich@durham.ac.uk	
	
Abstract:		
On	26	March	2015,	Saudi	Arabia	launched	airstrikes	on	Yemen	with	the	aim	to	restore	the	
rule	of	President	Abd	Rabbo	Mansour	Hadi	and	destroy	the	Houthi	movement.	Scholars	and	
policy	analysts	moved	quickly	to	examine	the	Yemen	war	as	a	by‐product	of	Saudi‐Iranian	
rivalry	 in	 the	 region	 and	 a	 sectarian	 struggle.	 These	 traditional	 explanations	 fall	 short	 of	
unravelling	the	Saudi	motive	behind	launching	a	large‐scale	operation	in	Yemen,	a	severely	
weakened	and	politically	divided	neighbour.	This	paper	offers	an	alternative	explanation	of	
abrupt	Saudi	aggressiveness	toward	Yemen.	 It	argues	that	 this	 intervention	 is	driven	by	a	
non‐material	 need;	 Saudi	 leadership	 aims	 to	 assert	 the	 Kingdom’s	 status	 as	 a	 regional	
power	in	the	Middle	East.		
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Introduction	
On	 26	 March	 2015,	 Saudi	 Arabia	 launched	 airstrikes	 on	 Yemen	 with	 the	 aim	 to	
restore	 the	 rule	 of	 President	 Abd	 Rabbo	Mansour	 Hadi	 and	 eliminate	 the	 Houthi	
movement.	Located	at	the	Bab	al‐Mandab	Strait	in	the	southern	entrance	of	the	Red	
Sea,	Yemen	has	always	constituted	a	cornerstone	of	Saudi	foreign	policy.	Since	the	
Kingdom’s	 foundation	 in	1932,	the	Saud	family	(Al	Saud)	has	strived	to	expand	its	
control	 to	 its	 southern	 neighbor	 and	 prevent	 it	 from	 threatening	 its	 interests.	 In	
1934,	 the	 first	modern	war	 broke	 out	 between	 the	 two	Arabian	 states.	 The	 1934	
Treaty	of	Ta’if	put	an	end	to	this	military	confrontation,	ceded	the	three	provinces	of	
Asir,	 Najran	 and	 Jizan	 to	 the	 army	 of	 Ibn	 Saud,	 and	 established	 a	 peaceful	
coexistence	 between	 the	 two	 countries.2	Since	 then,	 the	 Saudis	 have	 avoided	
confrontation	 and,	 instead,	 maintained	 precarious	 stability	 in	 Yemen	 through	
meddling	 in	 internal	 politics,	 backing	 local	 groups	 against	 others,	 using	 Yemeni	
guest	 workers	 as	 leverage,	 buying	 off	 tribal	 leaders,	 and	 conducting	 limited,	
occasional	military	operations,	especially	over	border	disputes.		
Operation	Decisive	Storm,	 the	 Saudi‐led	 intervention	 in	 Yemen	 that	 began	 in	
March	 2015	 constituted	 a	 break	 with	 this	 decades‐long	 peaceful	 coexistence.	
Although	Saudi	Arabia	had	spent	substantial	resources	on	military	procurement	and	
training	 over	 the	 last	 two	 decades—especially	 after	 the	 1991	 Gulf	 War—3never	
before	 had	 the	 Saudi	 Kingdom,	 or	 any	 of	 the	 Gulf	 states,	 so	 proactively	 and	
aggressively	deployed	their	military	forces	or	engage	in	a	large,	offensive	mission	as	
the	operation	in	Yemen.	The	intervention	in	Yemen	has	unveiled	a	new	era	in	Saudi	
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foreign	policy and	appears	to	overshadow	Gulf	politics	for	years	to	come.	This	paper	
attempts	 to	 explain	 this	 abrupt	 aggressiveness	 in	 Saudi	 policies	 toward	 Yemen	
while	situating	it	in	a	more	comprehensive	understanding	of	the	Kingdom’s	foreign	
policy	in	the	region	as	an	emerging	regional	power	fighting	for	its	status.		
Saudi	Arabia’s	motivation	in	the	Yemen	offensive	arguably	reflects	a	Kingdom	
that	is	starting	to	rely	on	its	own	resources	in	fighting	for	and	assert	its	status	as	a	
leading	 power	 in	 the	 region.	 Scholars,	 commentaries	 in	 the	 Arab	 media,	 and	
government	officials	have	often	characterized	the	war	in	Yemen	as	part	of	a	larger	
struggle	between	Saudi	Arabia	and	Iran	over	influence	in	the	Middle	East.	From	this	
perspective,	the	war	is	the	reaction	to	the	influence	of	Iran	expanding	in	the	Arabian	
Peninsula	 through	 the	 rebel	 Houthi	 movement.4	A	 proxy	 war	 with	 Iran,	 along	 a	
Sunni‐Shiite	divide,	became	central	tropes	in	Saudi	state‐owned	media.	Meanwhile,	
other	 scholars	 and	 commentaries	 focus	 on	 personalities	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 more	
structural	 factors.	 In	particular,	 the	ascendancy	of	King	Salman	al	Saud	 in	 January	
2015	 to	 power,	 and	 the	 parallel	 rise	 of	 his	 ambitious	 son,	 Prince	 Mohamed	 bin	
Salman,	 to	 a	 minister	 of	 defense,	 are	 often	 considered	 at	 the	 origin	 of	 this	
intervention.5	Many	scholars	explore	 the	evolution	 in	 the	decision‐making	process	
in	the	Saudi	Kingdom	that	followed	the		passing	of	King	Abdullah	and	attributed	the	
Yemen	 War	 to	 centralization	 of	 the	 decision	 in	 the	 office	 of	 the	 crown	 prince.6	
Despite	 the	 importance	 of	 individual	 decision‐makers,	 the	 preparation	 for	 the	
operation	 in	 Yemen	 has	 started	 since	 the	 Houthi	 take	 over	 Sana’a	 in	 September	
2014,	which	preceded	Salman’s	reign	by	several	months.7	
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This	 paper	 offers	 an	 alternative	 explanation	 of	 the	 Saudi	 intervention	 in	
Yemen	and	argues	 that	 this	 aggression	 is	driven	by	a	non‐material	need,	 that	 is	 a	
will	 for	 status.	 In	 the	 post‐2011	order,	 the	Kingdom	has	 fought	 for	 its	 status	 as	 a	
regional	power	at	both	regional	and	 international	 levels.	 In	 this	 context,	 the	Saudi	
leadership	 responded	 to	 regime	 change	 in	 Yemen	 with	 a	 violent	 intervention	 to	
confirm	 its	 status	 as	 a	 leading	 power	 in	 the	 region.	 The	 paper	 starts	 with	 an	
overview	of	the	Yemen	crisis	while	outlining	the	current	developments	in	the	war.	
The	 second	 section	 explores	 the	 drivers	 of	 the	 Saudi	 intervention	 in	 Yemen;	 it	
argues	that	this	aggressive	strategy	can	be	considered	as	a	status‐seeking	behavior	
and	 contextualizes	 this	 explanation	 within	 the	 International	 Relations	 literature.	
The	last	section	presents	an	assessment	of	the	overall	performance	of	Saudi	forces	
in	the	war	and,	 furthermore,	draws	out	the	implications	of	the	 intervention	on	the	
Yemen	crisis	and	its	ramifications	on	the	evolving	role	of	the	Saudi	Kingdom	in	the	
Middle	East.	
The	Road	to	Yemen	
Yemeni	politics	is	complex	and	often	plagued	with	shifting	alliances	at	domestic	and	
regional	levels.	Saudi	Arabia	has	historically	seen	Yemen	as	a	source	of	threat,	and	
its	 stability	 is	 inextricably	 connected	 to	 the	 security	 of	 the	 Arabian	 Peninsula.	
Whether	 the	 threat	 is	 real	 or	 imagined,	 the	 Saudi	 Kingdom	 employed	 several	
measures	 to	 control	 politics	 in	Yemen.	Mainly,	 it	 has	 relied	on	Ali	Abdallah	 Saleh,	
president	of	North	Yemen	from	1978	and	later	of	a	unified	Yemen	from	1990	until	
2012,	to	maintain	stability.	Fears	of	Yemen's	instability	peaked	with	the	appearance	
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of	Ansar	Allah	 (Partisans	of	God),	a	movement	headed	by	 the	Houthi	 family,	 in	 the	
mid‐2000s.	The	movement	emerged	as	a	result	of	economic	and	social	grievances	in	
northern	 Yemen,	 especially	 in	 the	 governorate	 of	 Saada.8	The	 movement	 has	
challenged	 the	authority	of	 the	central	government	 in	Yemen	since	 the	mid‐2000s	
and	 started	 an	 active	 rebellion	 in	 northern	 Yemen	 against	 the	 government	 of	 Ali	
Abdallah	 Saleh.9	In	 2009,	 Saudi	 Arabia	 openly	 entered	 the	 fighting	 against	 the	
Houthi	movement	and	launched	a	military	operation	on	its	southern	border	—	the	
first	Saudi	unilateral	operation	in	decades.10	This	operation	was	far	from	successful.	
The	Saudi	armed	forces	failed	to	incur	a	defeat	on	or	even	weaken	the	Houthi	rebels,	
which	 questioned	 the	military	 effectiveness	 of	 the	 Saudi	 armed	 forces	 despite	 its	
vast	technological	superiority.11		
The	 current	 crisis	 began	 during	 the	 2011	 Arab	 uprisings.	 The	 story	 of	 the	
uprisings	in	Yemen	was	not	different	from	that	in	Tunisia	or	Egypt.	The	diffusion	of	
protests	against	authoritarian	regimes	across	the	Arab	world	reinvigorated	Yemen’s	
marginalized	 social	 movements	 and	 united	 different	 geographical	 and	 political	
factions	 in	 Yemen,	 such	 as	 the	 northern	 Houthi	 movement	 and	 the	 southern	
secessionist	movement	Hiraak.12	In	2011,	the	mass‐based	revolutionary	movements	
demonstrated	 against	 the	 regime	 of	 then‐President	 Ali	 Abdullah	 Saleh	 and	
demanded	both	political	and	economic	reforms.	The	Houthis	and	their	main	party‐
militia	 found	 in	 the	uprisings	 a	new	outlet	 for	 their	discontent	 against	 the	central	
government.13	They	dropped	their	weapons	and	joined	the	peaceful	protests.14		
The	 Yemeni	 uprisings,	 like	most	 other	 uprisings	 in	 the	 Arab	 region,	 did	 not	
succeed	in	consolidating	a	genuine	democratic	transition	due	to	the	lacks	of	reforms	
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and	the	interference	of	regional	actors.15	The	Saudi	Kingdom,	along	with	other	Gulf	
monarchies,	swiftly	designed	a	transitional	plan	for	the	country	to	ensure	that	Saleh	
is	 replaced	 with	 a	 friendly	 government.	 The	 Saudis	 negotiated	 the	 ousting	 of	 Ali	
Abdullah	 Saleh	 and	 supported	 the	 vice‐President	 Abd	 Rabbo	 Mansour	 Hadi,	 in	 a	
one‐man	election.	Following	 this	 flawed	political	 transition,	Yemen	has	descended	
into	a	conflict	between	different	groups,	pushing	 the	country	 to	 the	edge	of	a	civil	
war.16	Four	years	after	the	uprisings,	in	September	2014,	the	Houthis	took	military	
control	 of	 the	 capital	 Sana’a	 and	 the	 state	 collapsed	 into	 power	 centers.	 Yemeni	
security	forces	became	divided	between	two	camps.	The	first	 is	 loyal	to	Hadi,	who	
still	 finds	 support	 in	 the	 south.	 The	 second	 is	 loyal	 to	 Saleh,	 who	 allied	with	 the	
Houthis	from	the	north.	The	picture	is	further	complicated	by	the	presence	of	other	
groups	who	benefited	from	this	divide	to	expand	their	 influence	in	Yemen,	namely	
al‐Qaeda	in	the	Arabian	Peninsula	(AQAP)	as	well	as	a	Yemeni	affiliate	of	the	Islamic	
State.17	
In	January	2015,	President	Abd	Rabbo	Mansour	Hadi	resigned.	The	collapse	of	
the	government	led	to	the	outbreak	of	violence	between	the	two	opposing	camps.	At	
the	end	of	February,	Hadi	fled	Sanaa	to	Aden	and	announced	it	as	his	new	capital.	On	
22	March	2015,	the	Houthis	marched	to	Aden,	seized	the	international	airport,	and	
bombed	Hadi’s	headquarters.	When	the	Houthis	started	their	assault	on	Aden,	Hadi	
fled	 the	 country	 to	 exile	 and	 called	 for	 external	 intervention.	 Within	 days,	 the	
Houthis	 expanded	 to	 the	 South,	 took	 Taiz—the	 country’s	 third‐largest	 city—and	
seized	al‐Anad,	where	 the	US	military	base	was	 located.	On	25	March	2015,	Saudi	
Arabia	 unilaterally	 launched	 an	 attack	 on	 Yemen	 under	 the	 name	 “Operation	
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Decisive	 Storm,”	with	 the	 announced	 aim	 to	 restore	 the	 legitimate	 government	 of	
Hadi	and	to	prevent	the	Houthis	and	their	allies	from	taking	control	of	the	country.	
Hours	 later,	 eight	 Arab	 states—Egypt,	 Bahrain,	 Kuwait,	 Qatar,	 the	 United	 Arab	
Emirates,	 Jordan,	 Sudan,	 and	 Morocco—announced	 their	 backing	 to	 the	 Saudi	
intervention,	what	can	be	conceived	as	the	largest	coalition	of	autocrats.	The	United	
States,	 the	 United	 Kingdom,	 and	 France	 have	 also	 backed	 the	 coalition	 providing	
diplomatic	and	logistic	support.	
The	 Kingdom	 officially	 announced	 that	 the	 goal	 of	 its	 intervention	 was	
“defending	 the	 legitimate	government	 in	Yemen”	and	 “saving	Yemeni	people	 from	
the	 Houthi	 aggression.”	 During	 the	 26th	 Arab	 League	 Summit	 in	 Sharm	 al‐Sheikh	
(28‐29	 March	 2015),	 King	 Salman	 vowed:	 “the	 campaign	 will	 continue	 until	 it	
achieves	 its	 goals	 for	 the	 Yemeni	 people	 to	 enjoy	 security.”18	Another	 narrative	
evolved	quickly	as	 the	primary	rationale	behind	the	Saudi	decision—that	of	a	war	
between	 the	Kingdom	and	 the	 so‐described	 Iran‐backed	Houthis,	who	belong	 to	a	
Shiite	 sect.	 In	 this	 context,	 Saudi‐owned	 media	 and	 religious	 authorities	 quickly	
portrayed	Yemen	as	a	battlefield	 for	 the	Saudis	 to	 fight	 the	Shiites,	perceived	as	a	
threat	not	only	to	Yemen	but	the	entire	region.19	King	Salman	accused	the	Houthis	of	
being	backed	by	Iran	and	of	causing	sectarian	division	 in	Yemen.20	In	other	words,	
the	 Kingdom	 attempted	 to	 portray	 its	 interventions	 in	 Yemen	 at	 the	 center	 of	 a	
Sunni	regional	effort	to	counter	the	threat	of	Iran	and	the	expansion	of	Shiism	in	the	
Gulf.	 Scholars	 and	 analysts	 quickly	 picked	 this	 line	 of	 argument	 to	 portray	 the	
conflict	 in	 Yemen	 as	 a	 struggle	 between	 the	 Saudi	 Kingdom	 and	 Iran,	 where	
divisions	within	Islam	mark	the	fault	lines	of	conflict.21	
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Describing	 the	 Yemen	 war	 as	 a	 proxy	 conflict	 along	 sectarian	 lines	 is	
erroneous	 and	misleading.	 First,	 the	 Iranian	 role	 in	 Yemen	 has	 been	 exaggerated	
and	 even	 deliberately	 distorted	 by	 the	 Saudis	 to	 legitimize	 their	 military	
intervention.	No	evidence	points	to	any	Iranian	involvement	in	Yemen	before	2014,	
and	 the	Houthis	 has	 evolved	 as	 a	 genuinely	 rebellious	movement	 that	 cuts	 across	
sectarian	 lines.	 The	 Houthi	 movement	 is	 a	 tribal	 group	 that	 is	 rooted	 in	 Yemeni	
political	context,	and	the	group’s	decisions	and	political	goals	are	rooted	in	its	local	
Yemeni	leadership.22	In	fact,	Iran	does	not	enjoy	any	command	over	their	decisions	
or	actions.	US	intelligence	officers	disclosed	information	that	further	casts	doubt	on	
the	 claims	 that	 the	 Houthis	 are	 a	 proxy	 group	 fighting	 the	 Kingdom	 on	 behalf	 of	
Iran.23	For	example,	 Iranian	representatives	warned	 the	Houthi	 rebels	 from	 taking	
the	 capital	 Sana’a,	 but	 the	 Houthis	 ignored	 this	 advice	 and	 took	 over	 the	 city	 in	
September	2014.	24		
In	contrast,	some	evidence	suggests	that	Iran’s	links	to	the	Houthis	might	have	
increased	at	the	end	of	2014.25	Yet,	this	evidence	remains	suggestive	at	best.	The	UN	
Panel	of	experts	on	Yemen	have	stated	in	January	2017	that	there	was	“no	sufficient	
evidence	 to	confirm	any	direct	 large‐scale	supply	of	arms	 from	the	government	of	
the	 Islamic	 Republic	 of	 Iran”.26	Also,	 it	 important	 to	 note	 that	 the	 Houthis	 have	
received	 military	 support	 from	 their	 most	 important	 ally,	 the	 former	 President	
Saleh,	whose	army	was	equipped	with	US	weapons.		The	UN	Panel	also	reported	that	
almost	68	percent	of	stockpile	of	the	Yemeni	military	was	lost	during	the	war,	some	
of	which	was	 destroyed	 but	 significant	weapons	 remain	 under	 the	 control	 of	 the	
Houthis.27	Hence,	 the	 alliance	with	Ali	Abdullah	Saleh	was	 far	more	 significant	 for	
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the	Houthis	than	the	alliance	with	Iran.	In	other	words,	the	crisis	in	Yemen	is	more	
complex	 than	 a	mere	 proxy	 struggle	 between	 Saudi	 Arabia	 and	 Iran.	 Instead,	 the	
crisis	 is	 rooted	 in	domestic	 political	 grievances	 and	 social	 inequalities.	As	Kendall	
succinctly	 states,	 “with	 or	without	 Iran’s	 involvement,	 the	 underlying	 structure	 of	
the	conflict	would	likely	be	the	same”.28	
The	political	struggle	in	Yemen	is	more	complex	than	a	mere	sectarian	binary.	
It	 is	 true	 that	many	members	of	 the	Houthi	movement	belong	 to	 the	Zaydi	 sect,	 a	
branch	of	Shiism.	Nevertheless,	it	is	wrong	to	assume	that	the	Yemen	crisis	is	driven	
by	 primordial	 identities.29	Zaydism	 is	 distinct	 from	 the	 “Twelver	 Shiism”	 found	 in	
Iran	both	 in	doctrine	and	practice.	 In	 fact,	 the	 theological	difference	between	both	
Zaydi	 and	 Twelver	 Shiism	 leaves	 the	 Zaydis	 closer	 to	 Sunni	 Islam.	The	 Zaydis	
present	themselves	as	a	separate	sect	distinct	 from	both	Shiism	and	Sunnism.	It	 is	
also	worth	noting	 that	Saleh’s	 supporters	 from	the	Yemeni	army	 fighting	with	 the	
Houthis	are	Sunnis.		
Paradoxically,	 the	Houthis	were	previously	Saudi	Arabia’s	ally.	 In	 the	context	
of	 the	 Arab	 Cold	 War,	 which	 dominated	 the	 region	 in	 the	 1950s	 and	 1960s,	 the	
struggle	in	Yemen	became	a	truly	proxy	war	between	Egypt	supporting	the	Republic	
and	 the	 Saudi	 Kingdom	 supporting	 the	 monarchy.30	In	 1962,	 a	 group	 of	 Yemeni	
officers	 staged	 a	 coup	d’état	 in	 Sanaa	 and	 overthrew	 the	monarchy	 to	 establish	 a	
republic.	The	ousted	monarch	 Imam	Muhammad	al‐Badr	 retreated	 to	 the	north	of	
Yemen	 where	 he	 became	 supported	 by	 the	 Zaydi	 tribes—the	 same	 tribes	 from	
which	 the	 Houthi	 movement	 emerged	 in	 the	 1990s.	 Following	 the	 Egyptian	
intervention	in	Yemen	to	support	the	coup	d’état,	the	Saudi	Kingdom	provided	the	
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Zaydi	 forces,	which	were	allied	with	al‐Badr,	with	weapons	and	support.	After	 the	
war,	 the	 Saudis	 marginalized	 the	 Houthis.	 Since	 the	 1980s,	 the	 Saudis	 launched	
campaigns	 to	 spread	Wahhabism	 in	 Yemen.	 Against	 this	 marginalization	 and	 the	
despotism	 of	 Saleh,	 the	Houthi	movement	 evolved	 into	 an	 insurgency	 against	 the	
regime	in	Sana’a.		
It	is	in	this	context	that	the	recent	crisis	in	Yemen	can	be	viewed	as	a	civil	war	
between	groups	in	a	political	struggle,	and	the	image	of	a	Sunni‐Shiite	proxy	war	in	
Yemen	is	only	a	distorted	narrative	presented	by	the	Saudi	Kingdom	to	legitimize	its	
aggression	 on	 Yemen.	 Furthermore,	 this	 sectarian	 narrative	 fails	 to	 account	 for	
decades	 of	 oppressive	 patrimonial	 rule	 in	 Yemen,	 persistent	 inequalities,	 and	
economic	 dependence.	 Similarly,	 the	 notion	 that	 the	 Houthis	 are	 Iranian	 pawns	
ignores	 the	 groups’	 marginalization	 and	 its	 participation	 in	 the	 uprisings.	 This	
narrative	 further	 downplays	 the	 role	 of	 the	 Gulf	 Cooperation	 Council	 (GCC),	 and	
Saudi	Arabia	in	particular,	in	hindering	the	transition,	which	led	to	the	outbreak	of	
the	civil	war.	Finally,	these	narrative	ignores	the	crucial	step	in	the	outburst	of	this	
violent	conflict	that	is	the	destructive,	full‐scale	military	operation	led	by	the	Saudi	
Kingdom.	 The	 following	 section	 aims	 to	 transcend	 these	 sectarian	 accounts	 and	
offers	an	alternative	explanations	of	the	war	as	a	struggle	for	status.	
Saudi	Struggle	for	Status	in	Yemen	
Scholarship	 on	 interventions	 has	 tended	 to	 focus	 on	 structural,	 material	
explanations.	Most	realist	theories	share	the	assumption	that	states	seek	survival	in	
an	anarchic	international	system	that	produces	external	threats,	such	as	shifts	in	the	
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relative	 power	 distribution,	 alignments,	 and	 the	 balance	 of	 power.	 From	 this	
perspective,	 the	 decision	 to	 intervene	 or	 not	 is	 based	 on	 a	 rational	 cost‐benefit	
analysis.31	Other	 strands	 in	 the	 scholarship	 on	 interventions	 focus	 on	 domestic	
characteristics	and	leaders’	causal	beliefs.32		
In	 contrast	 to	 predominant	 realist	 explanations	 of	war,	 some	 scholars	 argue	
that	symbolic,	non‐material	motives—status	in	particular—are	crucial	in	explaining	
states’	 recourse	 to	 armed	 strategies,	 including	 military	 interventions.	 Lebow	
provides	one	of	the	strongest	arguments	in	this	vein,	“honor	and	prestige	were	even	
more	 important	 than	 wealth	 and	 security”.33	He	 further	 argues	 that	 symbolic	
dimensions	 have	 been	 the	 driving	 motives	 for	 62	 percent	 of	 wars	 since	 1648.34	
These	 symbolic	 factors	 can	 better	 explain	 momentous	 shifts	 in	 foreign	 policy	
decision	 than	 conventional	 readings	 that	 emphasize	 strategic	 calculations.	 Max	
Weber	 argues	 that	 states	 accumulate	 military	 power	 to	 acquire	 power	 prestige	
(Machtprestige),	 defined	 as	 “the	 glory	 of	 power	 over	 other	 communities.”35	As	
Morgenthau	defines	prestige	as	“the	reputation	for	power,”	he	claims	that	states	can	
go	 to	 war	 to	 “impress	 other	 nations	 with	 the	 power	 one’s	 own	 nation	 actually	
possesses,	 or	with	 the	 power	 it	 believes,	 or	wants	 the	 other	 nations	 to	 believe,	 it	
possesses.”36		
Along	these	lines,	this	paper	argues	that	the	Al	Saud’s	decision	to	go	to	war	in	
Yemen	 in	 2015	 finds	 its	 origins	 in	 a	 struggle	 to	 assert	 the	 Kingdom's	 status	 as	 a	
regional	power	in	the	Middle	East.	Status	in	international	relations	is	a	standing	or	
rank	 in	 a	 community.	 Status	 has	 several	 meanings—position,	 perceptual,	 and	
social.37	Status	also	denotes	identity,	such	as	“status	a	major	power”	or	“status	as	a	
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regional	 power.”38	Actors,	 operating	 in	 a	 social	 system,	 acquire	 an	 identity	 that	
includes	a	definition	of	who	 they	are	 and	where	 they	 stand	 in	 relations	 to	others.	
Status	has	an	intersubjective	nature;	as	actors	develop	a	narrative	of	their	self	and	
their	rank	within	the	community,	they	expect	others	to	share	a	similar	belief	about	
their	status.	In	this	sense,	actors	are	in	constant	negotiation	with	their	surrounding	
social	structure.		
Status	concerns	often	emerge	when	states	develop	a	certain	expectation	about	
how	 much	 status	 they	 deserve,	 and	 they	 are	 accorded	 a	 lower	 status	 than	 their	
expectation.	As	status	usually	confers	influence,	actors	can	perceive	such	mismatch	
as	a	 threat	 to	 their	material	ambitions.	When	status	concerns	are	 triggered,	 states	
attempt	 to	shift	 their	position	 in	a	hierarchy.	 In	 the	case	of	a	 failure	to	change	the	
current	 hierarchy,	 states	 resort	 to	 conflict	 and	 violence.39	This	 initiation	 of	 a	
violence	 military	 conflict	 is	 usually	 considered	 to	 be	 a	 ‘status‐altering’	 event	 to	
compel	 the	 international	 community	 to	 change	 their	 beliefs	 about	 the	 actor’s	
standing	in	the	hierarchy.	
For	 decades,	 the	 Saudi	 Kingdom	 has	 relied	 on	 its	 religious	 status	 as	 the	
Custodian	of	the	Two	Holy	Mosques	and	on	its	oil	wealth	to	promote	its	pan‐Islamic	
identity	 narrative	 and	 its	 regional	 status	 as	 the	 leader	 of	 the	 Sunni	 and	 Muslim	
worlds.40	The	post‐2011	order	has	provided	 the	Kingdom	with	 the	opportunity	 to	
actively	 assert	 its	 status	 as	 a	 regional	 power	 able	 to	 shape	 outcomes	 in	 its	
neighborhood.	No	Arab	country	is	capable	of	achieving	the	status	of	a	dominant	or	
sole	regional	leadership;	Egypt	became	focused	on	its	domestic	problems	and	Syria	
fell	into	a	civil	war.	The	Saudi	intervention	in	Yemen	followed	a	gradual	escalation	in	
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the	use	of	armed	forces.41	The	Saudi	military	intervention	in	March	2011	in	Bahrain	
to	 help	 suppress	 the	 demonstrations	 as	well	 as	 the	 indirect	 support	 for	 the	 coup	
against	 the	Muslim	Brotherhood	and	 the	 restoration	of	 a	military	 regime	 in	Egypt	
gave	 the	 Saudis	 confidence	 in	 asserting	 their	 status	 as	 a	 regional	 power.42	
Nevertheless,	 regional	 and	 international	 actors	 did	 not	 support	 the	 claimed	 Saudi	
status.	 As	 the	 Saudis	 became	 status	 conscious,	 they	 felt	 treated	 far	 below	 their	
“appropriate”	 status	 from	both	 regional	 and	 international	 actors.	 I	 argue	 that	 this	
status	mismatch	 is	 at	 the	 origin	 of	what	many	observers	 qualify	 as	 a	 shift	 from	 a	
traditionally	 cautious	 foreign	 policy	 towards	 a	 more	 assertive,	 aggressive	
behavior.43	
The	Saudis	have	attempted	 to	assert	 their	status	as	a	 leader	 in	 the	GCC.	This	
attempt	has	taken	several	forms.	The	Saudis	sent	troops	to	support	its	Bahraini	ally,	
King	 Hamad	 Al	 Khalifa,	 against	 internal	 protests,	 which	 signaled	 Saudi	
determination	 to	 take	 the	 lead	 in	 protecting	 the	Gulf	 from	 the	 effects	 of	 the	Arab	
uprisings.	 Along	 these	 lines,	 Saudi	 Arabia	 proposed	 that	 the	 GCC	 be	 expanded	 to	
include	 Jordan,	 Morocco,	 and	 Egypt,	 an	 idea	 that	 was	 not	 welcomed	 by	 all	 GCC	
members.	The	Saudi	Kingdom	has	constantly	 insisted	on	the	 institutionalization	of	
an	 expanded,	 tighter,	 and	 greater	 union	 of	 the	 GCC	 under	 their	 command.	 King	
Abdullah’s	 proposals	 for	 greater	 political	 integration	 in	 the	 Gulf	 collapsed	 with	
Oman’s	 opposition	 and	 Kuwait’s	 reluctance.	 In	 December	 2013,	 Oman	 opposed	
Saudi	plans	for	a	unified	command	structure	for	the	armed	forces	of	the	six	states.	
Kuwait	 refused	 to	 sign	 a	 GCC	 internal	 security	 pact,	 as	 it	 will	 compromise	 its	
political	liberalism	and	its	exceptional	constitutional	principles	within	the	Gulf.	The	
 14
emergence	of	Qatari‐Emirati	animosity	over	Libya	and	the	Muslim	Brotherhood	 in	
Egypt	made	Saudi	ambitions	further	unattainable.	The	most	important	challenge	to	
the	Saudi	attempt	of	acquiring	the	recognition	of	Saudi	regional	status	in	the	Gulf	is	
Qatar’s	 foreign	 policy	 that	 explicitly	 opposed	 Saudi	 policies	 in	 Egypt	 and	 Syria,	
which	led	to	the	outbreak	of	the	recent	crisis	with	Qatar	in	2017.44	
The	 Saudi	 claim	 to	 regional	 leadership	 received	 another	 hit	 as	 the	 Kingdom	
failed	 to	 build	 a	 coalition	 against	 Iran.	 The	 Iranian	 influence	 in	 Iraq,	 Syria,	 and	
Lebanon	 exposed	 the	 Kingdom’s	 failure	 in	 acting	 as	 a	 regional	 power	 able	 to	
influence	 the	 outcome	 in	 its	 neighborhood.	 Relying	 on	 its	 Islamic	 identity,	 the	
Kingdom	 attempted	 to	 place	 itself	 at	 the	 center	 of	 a	 regional	 coalition	 (or	 in	
sectarian	terms	a	“Sunni”	coalition)	to	counter	its	 long‐lived	Shiite	enemy,	Iran.	All	
the	 GCC	 states	 except	 Saudi	 Arabia	 and	 Bahrain	 approved	 the	 interim	 nuclear	
agreement	between	the	US	and	Iran	in	November	2013	and	received	Iran’s	foreign	
minister.	Furthermore,	Oman	secretly	hosted	the	initial	preliminarily	deals	between	
Iran	 and	 the	 United	 States,	 which	 led	 the	 nuclear	 talks.	 Turkey,	 which	 seemed	 a	
natural	member	of	a	“Sunni”	coalition	against	Iran,	challenged	the	Saudi	Kingdom’s	
policies	 towards	 the	Muslim	Brotherhood	 in	Egypt.	 In	 this	 context,	 the	 Saudis	 felt	
that	 regional	 actors	 did	 not	 “appropriately”	 recognize	 their	 claim	 to	 regional	
leadership.	As	the	Saudis	have	accumulated	significant	military	capabilities	over	the	
decades,	 they	 felt	 that	 they	 were	 treated	 below	 their	 “appropriate”	 status.45	As	
Khalid	 al‐Dakhil,	 a	 prominent	 Saudi	 sociologist	 and	 commentator,	 stated,	 “During	
King	Abdullah,	we	did	not	have	a	foreign	policy,	and	just	watched	events	unfold	in	
front	of	our	eyes.”46		
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Furthermore,	 the	Arab	uprisings	 challenged	not	only	 the	Kingdom’s	 regional	
status	as	 the	 leader	of	Sunni	 Islam	but	also	the	credibility	of	 its	 identity	narrative.	
The	 rise	 of	 the	 Muslim	 Brotherhood	 to	 power	 in	 Egypt	 in	 2013	 constituted	 an	
important	 challenge	 to	 the	Kingdom’s	 narrative	 as	 the	 leader	 of	 Sunni	 Islam.	 The	
Kingdom	tried	to	build	a	regional	coalition	against	the	Brotherhood	by	announcing	
the	group	as	a	terrorist	organization	and	pressuring	others	to	follow	suit.	However,	
many	 states—Qatar,	 Kuwait,	 Morocco,	 Jordan—explicitly	 refused.47	Similarly,	 the	
Kingdom’s	quest	 to	place	 itself	 at	 the	 center	of	 a	 regional	 coalition	 to	 counter	 the	
Islamic	State	(IS)	did	not	resonate	in	the	region.	
At	 the	 international	 level,	 the	 Kingdom	 felt	 that	 its	 regional	 interests	 and	
ambitions	were	met	with	 “disrespect,”	 especially	 from	 the	United	 States.	 Since	 its	
foundation,	 the	Kingdom	has	 relied	 on	 external	 powers,	 first	 the	British,	 then	 the	
United	 States,	 to	 ensure	 its	 security.	 During	 the	 Iran‐Iraq	 War	 (1980‐1988),	 the	
Kingdom	supported	Iraq	in	its	war	against	the	Islamic	Republic	in	Iran.	In	1990,	the	
Kingdom	 called	 the	 United	 States	 to	 protect	 them	 from	 Saddam	 Hussein	 who	
invaded	 and	 annexed	 Kuwait.	 During	 the	 2000s,	 the	 Saudis	 have	 pursued	 their	
interests	in	Iraq,	Syria,	and	Lebanon	through	proxies.	Following	the	2011	uprisings,	
the	Saudis	became	convinced	that	the	divergence	between	Riyadh	and	Washington	
has	 hindered	 the	 Kingdom’s	 regional	 interests.	 Following	 the	 US	 reluctance	 to	
intervene	 in	 Syria	 after	 accusations	 of	 chemical	 weapon	 use	 in	 2013,	 the	 Saudi	
Kingdom	has	discarded	its	traditional	defense	doctrine	and	attempted	to	rely	on	its	
own	resources	for	security.	The	Saudis	perceived	Obama's	policies	in	the	region	not	
only	 as	 abandoning	 the	 US	 historical	 responsibilities	 towards	 preserving	 the	
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Kingdom’s	security	but	also	as	a	clear	disrespect	to	the	Kingdom’s	interests.48	As	the	
United	States	concluded	the	nuclear	deal	with	Iran	in	2015,	the	Saudis	felt	betrayed	
by	 the	 administration’s	 lack	 of	 transparency	 during	 the	 negotiations	 and	 that	 the	
Saudi	 needed	 to	 pursue	 their	 own	 interests	 assertively.49	In	 this	 context,	 the	
Kingdom	urgently	 needed	 a	 strong	 reaction	 to	 assert	 its	 status	 in	 the	 region,	 and	
Yemen	seemed	to	be	the	perfect	target.		
The	 accession	 of	 King	 Salman	 to	 the	 thrown	 after	 King	 Abdullah’s	 death	 in	
January	2015	has	been	followed	by	significant	changes	in	both	domestic	and	foreign	
policymaking.	 King	 Salman	 appointed	 Interior	 Minister	 Mohammed	 bin	 Nayef	 as	
crown	prince	and	his	 son	Mohammed	bin	Salman	as	defense	minister	 and	deputy	
crown	 minister.	 This	 ascendant	 branch	 of	 the	 Saudi	 ruling	 family	 appears	 to	 be	
willing	to	compensate	for	what	they	conceive	as	Abdullah’s	failure	in	acquiring	the	
Kingdom’s	status.50	By	using	its	accumulated	military	capabilities	in	a	war	in	Yemen,	
the	 Kingdom	 aims	 to	 assert	 its	 position	 as	 a	 regional	 power	 more	 effectively.	
Yemen—a	weak	failed	state—seemed	a	perfect	target	to	implement	the	Saudi	status	
policy.	In	fact,	the	Saudi	regime	is	now	asserting	a	claim	that	any	change	in	a	friendly	
government	will	no	 longer	be	 tolerated,	 thereby	 following	 the	classical	 strategy	of	
attacking	the	weaker	to	teach	their	opponents	a	lesson.		
Assessment	and	Implications	
Assessing	the	Saudi‐led	intervention	in	Yemen	is	a	challenging	task	due	to	the	lack	
of	independent	sources	in	Yemen	and	the	opacity	of	the	operation.	That	being	said,	a	
critical	mass	of	sporadic	information	has	been	published	in	UN	reports,	 interviews	
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of	 Gulf	 policy	 makers,	 experts	 reports	 and	 analyses.	 After	 a	 couple	 of	 years	 of	
incessant	 shelling	 by	 air,	 land,	 and	 sea	 the	 Saudis	 are	 learning	 the	 limits	 of	 their	
military	power	in	Yemen.	No	fundamental	victory	can	be	observed	as	the	advances	
of	 the	Houthis,	and	their	supporters	did	not	cease.	Until	now,	 the	 intervention	did	
not	change	the	balance	of	power	between	different	forces	on	the	ground.		
The	 first	phase	of	 the	 intervention	 included	 tight	air	 and	naval	blockade	 to	
prevent	 weapon	 supply	 from	 reaching	 the	 Houthis.	 This	 phase	 also	 included	
airstrikes	to	destroy	Yemen’s	air	and	costal	defense	and	ballistic‐missile	capabilities.	
After	 destroying	 the	 initial	 military	 targets,	 the	 coalition	 widened	 its	 scope	 to	
destroy	 the	 infrastructure	 to	 hinder	 the	Houthis’	mobility.	51	Yet,	 this	 air	war	 had	
high	costs.	The	collateral	damage,	including	civilian	casualties	and	the	humanitarian	
crises,	 has	 been	 acute,	 which	 led	 to	 the	 condemnation	 of	 the	 intervention	 in	
international	 forums.	 Despite	 these	 coercive	 attacks	 against	 the	 Houthis,	 the	
movement	 showed	 resilience	 through	 constant	 ballistic	 missiles	 fired	 over	 Saudi	
borders.	 More	 recently,	 the	 Houthis	 have	 fired	 ballistic	missiles	 toward	 Riyadh.52	
Furthermore,	the	ground	operation	in	Yemen	led	to	the	exposure	of	the	coalitions’	
forces	 to	attacks	by	 the	Houthis	and	 their	allies,	which	 led	 to	 substantial	 losses	 in	
Saudi	armed	forces.53	
In	 Saudi	 calculations,	 the	 potential	 costs	 of	 the	 intervention	 are	
overshadowed	by	the	Saudi	will	to	gain	the	status	of	a	regional	power.	This	motive	is	
manifest	 in	daily	press	conferences	since	the	beginning	of	the	intervention	held	by	
the	 Saudi	 Ministry	 of	 Defense	 with	 briefings	 on	 developments	 in	 the	 battlefield.	
These	events	have	become	an	opportunity	to	diffuse	the	image	of	a	regional	power	
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that	 decided	 to	 protect	 its	 interests	 aggressively	while	 adding	 their	 own	 sense	 of	
status.	In	the	first	few	months	of	the	intervention,	Brigadier	General	Ahmad	Asseri	
highlights	 the	 Saudi	 assumedly	 successful	 strikes	 by	 photos,	 videos,	 and	 other	
images.	 These	 briefs	 have	 particularly	 focused	 on	 spreading	 out	 Saudi	 Arabia’s	
military	 capabilities—including	warplanes,	 attack	 helicopters,	 tanks,	 and	 armored	
personnel	 carriers.	 The	 Kingdom	 has	 imposed	 a	 tight	 control	 over	 the	 media	 to	
avoid	 any	 revelation	 that	 the	 operation	 has	 so	 far	 failed	 to	 defeat	 the	 Houthis.	
Furthermore,	 the	Kingdom	has	used	 a	heavy	hand	 in	prohibiting	 any	 challenge	 to	
the	 official	 narrative	 of	 a	 “just”	 and	 “necessary”	 war.	 Any	 Saudi	 national	 who	
criticizes	the	war	is	risking	significant	fines	and	a	perennial	prison	sentence.	
	 The	 intervention	 has	 dangerous	 implications	 for	 both	 Yemen	 and	 the	
Kingdom.	The	war	between	the	Saudi‐led	coalition	and	the	Houthi	rebels	is	bringing	
Yemen	 to	 the	 brink.	 Although	 the	 Saudi	 intervention	 aimed	 to	 destroy	 the	
capabilities	 of	 the	 Houthis,	 it	 seems	 stirring	 the	 group’s	 antagonism	 and	 enmity	
towards	the	Kingdom	rather	than	deterring	it.	The	Houthis	do	not	show	any	signs	of	
weakening	nor	are	they	likely	to	give	up	on	their	resistance.	Furthermore,	the	longer	
the	war	 continues,	 the	more	 likely	 the	Houthis	 become	 increasingly	 vulnerable	 to	
Iranian	influence	out	of	necessity.		
Another	presumably	unintended	implication	of	the	war	in	Yemen	has	been	the	
expansion	 of	 al‐Qaeda	 and	 the	 Islamic	 State	 (IS)	 offshoots,	 especially	 in	 eastern	
Yemen.	 Amid	 the	 chaos	 created	 by	 the	 collapse	 of	 the	 government	 and	 the	 fights	
between	the	Saudi‐led	coalition	and	the	Houthis,	these	groups	found	a	fertile	ground	
for	 expansion;	 they	 acquired	 territory	 and	 increased	 their	 influence.54	As	 these	
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groups	 have	 their	 own	 agenda	 and	 fight	 both	 the	 Saudi‐led	 coalition	 and	 the	
Houthis,	the	resolution	of	this	conflict	became	even	more	complicated.	This	war	has	
further	 fragmented	 the	 country,	 created	 long‐term	 instability,	 and	 allowed	 even	
extremists	to	thrive.		
Whereas	 analysts	 consider	 the	 expansion	 of	 these	 groups	 as	 the	 most	
dangerous	 development	 of	 the	 Saudi	 war	 in	 Yemen,	 the	 greatest	 danger	 to	 the	
Kingdom	comes	from	the	humanitarian	crisis	caused	by	the	war.	Since	March	2015,	
the	sea,	air,	and	naval	blockade	over	the	country	imposed	by	the	coalition	sparked	a	
catastrophic	humanitarian	crisis.	The	airstrikes	have	 targeted	 the	 infrastructure—
airports,	roads,	factories,	and	power	stations—in	a	country	that	was	already	unable	
to	 maintain	 a	 basic	 infrastructure	 without	 foreign	 aid.	 The	 attacks	 also	 targeted	
civilians,	refugee	camps,	schools,	places	of	worship	and	residential	buildings,	which	
highly	 increased	 the	war	casualties	and	atrocities.	Despite	 the	announced	cease	 in	
military	 actions	 and	 change	of	 tracks	 toward	 a	 political	 process	under	 “Operation	
Restoration	Hope”	on	21	April	2015,	the	military	campaign	has	continued.	What	the	
Saudis	have	estimated	to	be	a	short‐lived	campaign	seems	to	turn	into	a	long	war	of	
attrition.	According	 to	 the	United	Nations,	 from	26	March	2015	through	26	March	
2017,	the	war	has	caused	more	than	13,045	civilians	dead,	two	million	displaced,	18	
million	in	need	of	some	humanitarian	assistance.55		
The	 prolongation	 of	 the	 war	 and	 the	 increasing	 humanitarian	 cost	 risk	
undermining	the	Kingdom’s	claim	for	status	at	the	regional	level.	The	Saudi	identity	
narrative	 officially	 embraces	 the	 ideals	 of	 Islam,	 which	 prescribe	 solidarity	 and	
fraternity	 among	 Muslims	 and	 prohibit	 fighting	 or	 causing	 harm	 to	 brotherly	
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Muslim	 people.	 Although	 the	 Kingdom	 portrays	 the	 Houthis	 as	 Shiite	 Others,	 the	
humanitarian	 crisis	 is	 affecting	 all	 Yemeni	 population,	 which	 is	 constituted	 of	 a	
Sunni	majority.		
***	
Ultimately,	 the	 Saudi‐led	 intervention	 in	Yemen	 is	 an	 example	of	 pursuing	 a	 risky	
military	 intervention	 to	 attain	 status	 in	 the	 region.	 The	 intervention	proved	 to	 be	
flawed.	 The	 cost	 of	 the	 operation	 continue	 to	mount	 for	 the	 Saudi	 Kingdom,	 and	
there	is	still	no	appearing	agenda	to	minimize	the	costs.	Despite	mounting	political,	
economic,	and	military	costs,	the	Saudi	elite	persists	in	this	failing	intervention.	The	
perseverance	in	this	catastrophic	war	reflects	the	Saudi	elites’	aversion	to	perceived	
losses,	 especially	 in	 terms	of	 status,	 and	 any	 attempt	 to	 solve	 the	 conflict	without	
conveying	the	image	of	a	Saudi	victory	is	unlikely	to	succeed.	
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